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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HARRIS, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Appellant 
v. 
FOXHOLLOW CONSTRUCTION & 
TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, L.N. JOHNSON PAVING, 
LLC. a limited liability company, 
Respondents, 
and 
DA VID EGAN, an individuaL 
FERGUSON FARMS, d/b/a 
FERGUSON TRUCKING, D. KYM 
FERGUSON, an individual. MICHAEL 
FERGUSON. an individuaL 
Respondents. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36601-2009 
lefferson County Docket No. 2005-642 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Harris, Inc. C'Harris"), by and through its counsel of record, Norman G. Reece, P.c., hereby 
submits the following Appellant's Reply Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case \vas set forth fully in Appellant's initial brief and will not be 
repeated here. See genera/~r Appellant's Briel: dated September L 2010 ("Appellant's Brief) at 2-8. 
Therefore. the nature of the case. course of proceedings. and statement of facts in Appellant's Brief 
arc incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
ISSljES PRESENTEI> ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that Harris failed to prove damages? 
Did the court err in refusing to award damages on the ground that the evidence did 
not show whether the damages incurred were a result of the 10hnson contract, the Foxhollow 
contract, or both? 
3. Did the court err in finding that the payments Harris sent to 10hnson were not for 
Johnson's work on the Fremont Project? 
4. Did the court err in holding Harris f~iiled to prove the General Conditions were a part 
of the subcontract with Johnson and Foxhollow and in denying indemnification to Harris? 
5. Did the comi crr in not awarding damages against the Fergusons? 
6. Did the comi crror in refusing to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 55/55-A? 
7. Did the court err in denying Harris' Motion to Amend Findings and Conclusions? 
8. Did the court err in awarding attorney fees and court costs to Johnson against Harris? 
9. Did the court err in a\varding attorney fees and court costs to the Fergusons against 
Harris? 
10. Did the court err in denying Harris' Motion for New Trial? 
ST ANI>ARI) OF' REVIEW 
Following a court trial, the appellate court reviews the record to determine if the findings of 
-- ---------
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f~tct are supported by the evidence and if the conclusions of Jaw are supportcd by the findings offact. 
(irijfilh v. ('lear Lakes Trout Co .. 143 Idaho 733. 737. 1 P.3d 604. 608 (2007). appeal afier 
remand, 146 Idaho 613. 200 P.3d 1] 62 (2009). In reviewing the conclusions oflaw following a 
court triaL the appellate court "is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw 
its o\vn conclusions from the facts presented:' Griffith, 143 Idaho at 737, 152 P.3d at 608. 
As to the awards of attorney fees in this case, they are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Ahha/ka v. S'hepherd. 145 Idaho 547, 549. 18 I P.3d 473.475 (2008). 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT HARRIS, 
INC. FAILED TO PROVE DAMAGES. 
Harris· Appellanfs Brief discussed several items of evidence admitted at the trial as proof 
of damages. The documentary evidence was admitted as business records and as such, constituted 
competent substantial evidence of damages. Moreover, Scott Harris, the president of Harris, Inc., 
testi fled from personal knowledge concerning other items of damage. 
Exhibit 23 - Continuation Sheet of 08/31102. 
Exhibit 23 was discussed at length in Appellanfs Brief at 10-12. In its response, L.N. 
10hnson merely discusses Harris' trial testimony concerning Exhibit 23, including the precise dollar 
amounts reflected in Exhibit 23, and notes that Exhibit 23 was admitted over objection from the 
Respondents. See Respondent, L.N. 10hnson Paving, L.L.c.'s Reply Brief on Appeal, dated 
September 22. 2010 C-10hnson Brief') at 5. 10hnson then cites the trial court's First Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the court denied an award of damages on the 
ground that Harris did not present evidence that Harris paid a third party to complete the work left 
unfinished on the Johnson subcontract. 10hnson Brief at 19 . Yet Johnson acknowledges receiving 
two progress payments from Harris for the Fremont Project while disclaiming any liability on the 
AI'I'I:I.I ANI'S RII'I.'!' 13RIIF .:1 
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ground that Johnson did not retain the monies received. Johnson Brief at 19-20. 
The Fergusons adopt by reference Johnson's response on the damages proof: and offer no 
additional argument. See Respondent's Brieffiled on behalfofFerguson. dated September 30,2010 
(,'Ferguson Brief') at 16. 
As noted in Harris' initial brief. certain progress payments received into evidence as Exhibit 
21 are reflected in Exhibit 23. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The trial court found, and Johnson 
admitted, the progress payments were deposited into Johnson's bank account. R. 1222 "r A(l )(i)], 
R. 1224 r'l A(I )(11) I: Tr. 296:7-21: 298:4-10. 
Moreovcr. the damages reflected in Exhibit are chargeable in their entirety to Johnson. 
First, Scott Harris testified that the progress payments reflected in Exhibit 23 were made to both 
Johnson and Foxhollow. Tr. 90:] 7-91 :2. Second. the trial court found that Egan, as Johnson's 
agent. or Egan's subordinate. failed to inform Harris about unpaid invoices and misrepresented to 
Harris that all third-party lessors had been paid. R. 1247 [" 2(b)], R. 1253 1'II2(d)]. Third, the court 
found I Iarris incurred damages due to Egan and Johnson's breach of contract by withholding 
invoices as the progress payments were made to Johnson during the same time the invoices were 
withheld. R. 1 [~A(J)(i)] and R. 1224-25 ['II,-r A(l)(p)-(q)]. Fourth, it is irrelevant whether 
Johnson or Johnson' s agent ultimately received the proceeds from the progress payments. Harris 
made the progress payments, and thus incurred damages, as a result of a breach of the contract by 
Johnson through its agent. Egan. Failure to pay and/or inform Harris about unpaid mvolces 
constituted the breach of contract. Therefore. Johnson is liable for Harris' damages. 
Exhibit 25 - 09/18/02 Letter from Harris to Egan. 
Exhi bit 25 was admitted at trial wit/lOut objection/rom the Respondents and shows a precise 
amount of damages incurred ($81,2 I 0.33), in addition to the progress payments (Exhibit 2 I), due 
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to Johnson '5 breach of contract when Harris had to pay third-party lessors and materialmen. 
Appellant's Brief at I 13. 
In response, Johnson merely discusses several items of correspondence between the paJiies 
in September of 2002. including Exhibit Johnson Brief at 6-7. IIowever, Johnson offers no 
argument whatsoever in response to Ilarris' contention that Exhibit is substantive evidence of 
damages. 
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson' s response on damages proof and offers no additional 
argument about Exhibit 25. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
The Respondents' rai lure to o ITer any argument whatsoever as to Han'is' posi tion that Exhibit 
is substantive evidence of damages is critical. It is a critical omission in light of the fact that a 
Harris business record. 15-LN Johnson Alternate 1" was part of Exhibit 25 and showed the precise 
amounts of damages Harris incurred by way ofpayments to third-party lessors or materialmen which 
Harris was obligated to pay after Johnson misrepresented to Harris that such billings had already 
been paid. ,)'ee Appellant's Brief at 12-13. 
Exhibit 52 - Job Cost Ledger. 
Exhibit 52 was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 13-14. In response. however. Johnson 
merely discusses Harris' testimony in offering Exhibit 52 (admitted over objection). but gives no 
responsive argument coneerning Exhibit 52 as substantive evidence of damages. Johnson Brief at 
6. Again. Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response to Exhibit 52 as damages proof. and 
offers no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
The document in E~xhibit 52 is substantive. competent evidence of damages admitted into 
evidence as a business record. Respondents' failure to offer any argument whatsoever concerning 
its value as substantive. competent evidence belies their contention that Harris failed to prove 
damages. 
Exhibit 53 - .Job Cost Journal. 
Exhibit 53 is discussed in Appellant's Brief at I In response. ho\vever. Johnson ofTers no 
argument at all concerning Exhibit 53. as evidence ofdamages or otherwise. Ferguson again adopts 
by reference .1ohnson·s response on damages proof. and ofTers no additional argument regarding 
Exhibit 53. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
As \yith Exhibit also admitted as a business record. Respondents' failure to otTer any 
argument concerning its value as substantive. competent evidence of damages bel ies their contention 
that 1 Iarris failed to prove damages. 
Payment to Ferguson as Damages. 
Harris' payment to Ferguson of certain monies that are chargeable as damages against 
Johnson was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 14-15. Surprisingly, even though Harris contends 
those monies are chargeable to Johnson. Johnson offers no responsive argument concerning them. 
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response on damages proof and offers no additional 
argument on this particular issue. Ferguson Briefat J 6. Accordingly, Harris stands by the argument 
set forth in its initial brief that Scott Harris' testimony concerning this item of damages. being 
uncontradicted. cannot be arbitrarily discarded and must be accepted by the trier of fact unless 
inherently improbable. S'ee Appellant's Brief at J 4-15 and authorities cited therein. 
Damages from Pro Rentals Litigation. 
Damages incurred by f-Iarris as a result of a separate lawsuit arising fl'om this matter were 
discussed in Appellant's Briefat 15-16. As noted therein. the tria! court tookjudieial notice of Judge 
Richard T. St. Clair' s Memorandum Decision and Order. filed October 16.2003, in Jefferson County 
Case No. CY -03-314 ("St. Clair Decision"). Tr. 176:25-178:3. Attached in the Appendix is a 
AI'I'II.LANrs RIYLY IlRIIT (, 
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complete copy of Judge Sc Clair's decision. 
Johnson's response to this item of damages acknowledges Harris asked the court to take 
judicial notice of Judge St. Clair's decision, but fails to offer any argument whatsoever regarding the 
decision as evidence of damages. Johnson Briefat 9-\ O. Instead, Johnson merely cites Scott Harris' 
testimony that he did not personally know whether Johnson's equipment or employees were ev,:::r at 
the job site. and that Foxhollow rented the equipment which was on the job site. Johnson Brief at 
9-10. 
Again, Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response on damages proof: and offers no 
additional argument on this particular issue. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
It is clear that Judge St. Clair's decision established damages in precise amounts which were 
the result of unpaid invoices on the Fremont Project during the same time that Harris made progress 
payments. S'ee Appellanfs Brief at 15: St. Clair Decision at 4.7,14-15 and 21. Judge St. Clair's 
decision was not rebutted in any way by any of the Respondents. As stated, the court took judicial 
notice of the decision wit/lOut objection from any of the Respondents. Tr. 176:25-178:3. Moreover, 
Scott Harris' testimony concerning the specific amounts of damages he incurred - and paid - as a 
result of the Pro Rentals litigation. in addition to the judgment itselt~ went unrebutted by the 
Respondents. S'ee Appellant's Briefat 15. Therefore, it could not be arbitrarily disregarded by the 
trial court. See Appellant" s Brief at 16. 
Harris' Testimony re Cost to Finish, Warranty 
and Supervisory Work, Use of Harris Equipment. 
The evidence offered by Harris in this regard was discussed in Appellant's Brief at 16-18. 
Johnson's response argues that Harris' testimony in this regard was too speculative, because Harris 
used such terms as "around" and '"approximately" in testifying about the costs to complete the 
Johnson subcontract. Johnson Brief at 17-18. Johnson also takes issue for Scott Harris' "estimate" 
API'ELLANrs RFI'IY 13RIIT 7 
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of $7.000.00 in supervisory time even though it was based, according to tlarris. on a typical 
management fee. Johnson Briefat 18. Johnson also takes issue with Scott Harris' $6,000.00 figure 
for backhoe and dump truck rental. calculated at $2.000.00 per month for three months. Johnson 
Brief at 18. 
Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's response in this regard and offers no additional 
argument. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
As shmvn in the next section. however. Harris' evidence of damages was not speculative. 
It was substantive, competent proof of damages. 
Evidence of Damages Offered by Harris was not Speculative. 
As discussed in Appellant's initial brief. evidence offered by Harris as evidence of damages 
was not speculative. See Appellant's Brief at ] 7. This substantive evidence was left unrebutted by 
Defendants and cannot be disregarded by the court. even if it stems from the testimony of an 
interested witness. See Appellant's Brief at 18 and authorities cited therein 
Johnson claims 11arris' testimony on damages gave amounts that were confusing and 
contradictory with no direct evidence as to damages incurred due to Johnson's alleged breach of 
contract. Johnson Briefat 18-19. Ferguson adopts by reference Johnson's responsive argument in 
this regard. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
However. "Ir]easonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical 
exactitude; rather. the evidenee need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the 
realm of speculation:' Todd v. Sullivan ('onslruction LLe. 146 Idaho 118, 122, 191 P .3d 196. 200 
(2008) [citing Gri/lilh, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611]. 
As shown above. Harris submitted amounts of damages precise enough to be removed from 
the realm of speculation. In most instances. precise amounts were offered into evidence - amounts 
APPELLANT'S RJ:I'LY IlRIIF 8 
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that were not, contrary to Respondents' assertions ~ "confusing" or "contradictory." In a few 
instances, Scott Ilarris estimates and explained the basis for his calculations. This testimony 
was sufficient to avvard damages. IJeco ('O}1slruct;oJ1 ('0. v. lIarper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 
9.936 P.2d 202.207 (el. App.). rev denied. (1997) (holding that testimony from company president 
as to "approximate" amounts of damages was substantial, competent evidence supporting the jury 
award). 
While speculation or conjecture cannot be a basis for damages, the evidence should 
approximate an accurate estimate. Felder v. Physiotherapy Associates, 215 Ariz. 154, 162, 158 P.3d 
877, 885 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, it is the wrongdoer, and not the irtiured party that 
'''should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages .. ,' so '''the standard for 
determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as thc standard for proving the fact of 
damages. ,., Promax Development Corp. v. Matlson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App.), ccrt. denied, 
953 P.2d 449 (1997) [quoting AIkin Wrighl & Miles v. AJoumain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
709 P.2d 330. 334 (Utah 1985)J. Therei()re. to "prove the amount of damages, the evidence must 
'riser] above speculation and provide! ] a reasonable. even though not necessarily preeise, estimate 
of damages. '" Promax Development ('orp., 943 P.2d at 255 [quoting AIkin FVrighl & Miles, 709 P.2d 
at 334]. In the Promax case, the court held that testimony concerning the fair market value of a 
home as being "approximately" $390.000.00 was sufficient to support a damages award. PromtlX 
Development COfT .. 943 P.2d at 257. 
Thus. the court erred in refusing to award damages to Harris. "The fact that contract damages 
are not capable of exact proof does not preclude their availability as a matter of law." () 'Dell v. 
Ba'\abe, 119 Idaho 796, 8 J 2, 8 J 0 P.2d 1082. 1098 (J 991). See also, Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 
274,280,923 P.2d 981.987 (1996), subsequent costs andjeesproceeding, 132 Idaho 830, 979 P.2d 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 9 
1188 (1999). 
If the plaintiff shows damages resulted, a court cannot refuse to award damages merely 
because it is di1Ticult to determine an exact amount of damages. Griffith. 143 Idaho at 741. 152 P.3d 
at 61 That is what happened here. The court found Harris incurred damages, but refused to 
determine the amount of damages. "Ultimately it is fc)r the trier of fact to fix the amount by 
determining the credibility of the witnesses. resolving conflicts in the evidence, and drawing 
reasonable inferences therefrom." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. The court's refusal 
10 do so requires reversal. 
Harris Business Records Were Substantive Evidence of Damages. 
The Harris business records as substantive. competent evidence of damages were discussed 
in Appellanf s Brief at 17-18. Johnson discusses the substance of Exhibits 23 and 52, and Scott 
Harris' testimony as to what those exhibits show. Johnson Brief at 5-6. 26. However. nowhere in 
its response does Johnson address the admissibility of Harris' business records as substantive, 
competent evidence. This is a critical omission. S'ee Beco Construction Co., 130 Idaho at 9, 936 
P.2d at 207 (holding testimony from company president as to approximate amounts of damages was 
substantial, competent evidence to support jury award). As noted, Ferguson offers no additional 
argument in this regard. and merely adopts by reference Johnson's response. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD DAMAGES ON 
THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW WHETHER 
THE DAMAGES INCURRED WERE A RESULT OF THE JOHNSON 
CONTRACT, THE FOXHOLLOW CONTRACT, OR BOTH. 
Harris' argument in this regard entailed f()ur basic points. They are discussed in Appellant's 
Brief at J 8-20. 
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First and most importantly, the court found that "Foxhollow completed work on the Fremont 
Project 011 behalf of Johnson 's subcontract with (Jarris, Inc." R. 1246 [~G( 1 )( e)] (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the court f()Und that "'all of Egan's actions were taken as the agent for Johnson alld an 
employee of Foxhollow:' R. I 253 I~I 2( d)] (emphasis added). Appellant's Brief at 18. 
Second, Exhibit indeed showed a breakdmm of work completed by Foxhollow alld 
.Johnson as of August 31. 2002. Tr. 74: II :4; 76:6-15. Appellant's Brief at 19 . 
Third, the court also found that Harris incurred damages due to Egan and Johnson's breach 
of con tract by withholding invoices as the progress payments were made to Johnson during the same 
time the invoices were withheld. R. I [~A(1 )(i)J and R. I 224-25 [~~ A( 1 )(p)-(q)]. Appellant's 
Bridat Sec also S1. Clair Decision at 8. 
Fourth. the fact the court thought it was unable to segregate damages as between the Johnson 
and Foxhollow subcontracts is of no moment because all damages were the result of Egan's breach 
and. as the court found, Egan was Johnson's agent and Foxhollow's employee. Appellant's Brief 
at 18- J 9. 
In response, Johnson offers no argument or discussion concerning Egan as an employee of 
Foxhollow and an agent for Johnson. Similarly, Johnson otfers no discussion or rebuttal argument 
concerning the court's findings that FoxholIow completed work on the Fremont Project on behalf 
of Johnson's subcontract with Harris. Again. Ferguson' s response merely adopts by reference 
Johnson's response and offers no additional argument on this point. Ferguson Brief at 16. 
Accordingly. Harris stands by its original argument found in its initial brief. See Appellant's 
Brief at 18-20. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COllRT ERRED IN FINDIN(; THAT THE 
PAYMENTS HARRIS SENT TO .JOHNSON WERE NOT 
FOR JOHNSON'S WORK ON THE FREMONT PROJECT. 
This point is initially discusscd in Appellanfs Brief at 20. Harris' argument in this regard 
is four-fold: 
First. the court held that "It Jhe checks Harris, Inc. paid to Johnson appear to be for the work 
that Foxhollow completed on the Fremont Project."· R. 1230 [~: 13(1 )(b)]. But this is at odds with 
at least two other findings the court made: (a) that "Harris, Inc. subcontracted the excavation, tilling, 
grading and culvert work on the Fremont Project to both Foxhollow and Johnson" R. ] 227 [~2(b)] 
(emphasis added): and (b) that ·'Harris. Inc. sent checks to Johnson for itS' portion of the excavation, 
filling. grading and culvert work .. · R. 1227 [~2(b)]. Appellant's Briefat 20. 
Second. Exhihit 23 showed monies paid by Harris were for both Foxhollow and Johnson as 
to the Fremont Project. Tr. 74:11-75:4: 76:6-15. Appellanfs Brief at 20. 
Third, given the court's finding that "all of Egan's actions were taken as the agent for 
Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow."' R. 1253 [~ 2(d)] (emphasis added), Foxhollow's work 
on the Fremont Project was on behalf of Johnson. The court so found. R. 1246 [~ G(1)( a)]. 
Appellanfs Brief' at 20. 
Fourth, even if the progress payments cannot be segregated between Johnson's subcontract 
and Foxhollow's subcontract, the fact would remain that every payment went to either the principal 
(Johnson) or its agent (Foxhollow/Egan). If all of Egan's actions were, as the court found, as an 
employee of Foxhollow and an agent for Johnson, then the progress payments had to be for 
Johnson's work on the Fremont Project. Appellant's Brief at 20. 
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In response, Johnson merely cites the fact that payments were sent from Harris to Johnson, 
after which Johnson wrote checks for the same amounts to Foxhollow. Johnson Brief at 19-20. 
Johnson simply states it retained no monies for the Fremont Project. Johnson Brief at 17. 
Ferguson's response adopts Johnson's response by reference and offers no additional argument. 
Ferguson Brief at 17. 
As shown. the court's o\\n findings contradict its ruling that the progress payments were not 
for Johnson' s work 011 the Fremont Project. As noted. the court found that all of Egan's actions were 
taken as Johnson's agent and Foxhollow's employee. R. 1253 r,r 2(d)]. Moreover, the fact.lohnson 
may not have retained the progress payments does not relieve it of liability. because it forwarded 
those payments to its agent. The court found that Johnson' s agent committed the breach which 
eaused Harris' damages. R. 1222 r,r A( 1 )(i) J and R. 1224-25 r'l'i A( 1 )(p)-(q)]. The fact that Johnson 
may not have retained the progress payments does not relieve it ofliability. as its agent committed 
the breach that caused llarris' damages. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARRIS FAILED TO 
PROVE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS WERE A PART OF 
THE SUBCONTRACT WITH JOHNSON AND FOXHOLLOW 
AND IN DENYING INDEMNIFICATION TO HARRIS. 
Harris' initial arguments on this issue were discussed in Appellant's Briefat 21-22. Harris' 
argument is based on four main points: 
First the General Conditions (Exhibit 50) was admitted without objection, after Scott Harris 
testified it was a true and correct copy of the General Conditions as they existed as of 2002 and as 
attached to each subcontract Harris wrote in 2002. Tr. 38: 12-39: 12. Appellant's Brief at 21. 
Second. Harris' foundational testimony wel1t lmrebutted, and Exhibit 50 was admitted 
without objection. Tr. 39: 13-23. Therefore, any issues as to the authenticity of Exhibit 50 were 
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waived when Respondents' counsel allowed Exhibit 50 to be admitted without objection. 
Appel lant' s Brief at 21 . 
Third, the trial court found that Egan, as Foxhollow's employee and Johnson's agent, had the 
responsibility to assure that supplier and equipment invoices were given to Harris. R. 1250 r~ 
H( I )(b)l. The only source j()f that duty is contained in the General Conditions, Exhibit 50. No such 
duty or re!lponsibili(v isfoum/ ill either of the subcontracts. Appellant's Brief at 
Fourth, the court found that Johnson, through its agent Egan, breached this contractual duty 
and that Harris was damaged as a result. R. 1 [~ A(l)(i)J and R. 1224-25 [~fI A(l)(p)-(q)]. 
Appellant's Brief at 
In response, Johnson merely argues the court's ruling on Exhibit 50 was proper, because it 
was dated more than three months after the subcontract was signed, and that the subcontracts had 
no (Jeneral Conditions attached to them. Johnson Brief at 20. Moreover. Johnson argues the court's 
refusal to find Exhibit 50 was a part of the eontract is supported by Idaho Rule of Evidence (LR.E.) 
1004(3). Johnson Brief at 21. Ferguson's response adopts by reference Johnson's response and 
offers no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 17. 
Johnson's argument pertains to foundational Issues and authenticity of Exhibit 50 in 
particular. However. once Exhibit 50 was admitted without o~jection from any ofthe Respondents, 
it became substantive, competent evidence. Johnson's contention as to the date contained on Exhibit 
50 was never brought up during the evidentiary portion of the trial. The record will show no such 
attempted rebuttal. Thus, it remained substantive, competent evidence which the Court was not free 
to disregard. 
Any issues the Respondents had as to the authenticity of Exhibit 50 were waived when they 
allowed Exhibit 50 to be admitted without objection. Tr. 39: 13-23. Several Idaho decisions so hold: 
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"We will not eonsider issues pertaining to the admission of evidence when no objection was 
raised to admission at triaL" Kra(y v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 303, 208 P.3d 281, 285 (2009). If a 
party fails to object to an exhibit's admission at triaL it thereby waives any objection to the exhibit. 
",-,. Alphonsus Diversified ('are, Inc. v. lvlRI A.,,·sociates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,494, 224 P.3d 1068, 
1083 (2009). Thus. failure to object to evidence introduced at trial fails to preserve on appeal the 
issue ofadmissibility. Hunter \'. State, 138 Idaho 44,51.57 P.3d 762 (2002). See also Chenery 
v. Agri-Lines Corp .. 115 Idaho 28 L 286, 766 P.2d 751, 756 (1988) (holding that if a party fai!s to 
object to the admission of evidence at trial, the issue of its admission is not properly before the 
appellate court); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 596, 603 P.2d 156, 162 (1979) (holding 
that ira party fails to object to an exhibit's admission into evidence. the party cannot on appeal raise 
the issue of error in the exhibit's admission). 
In short, any issue as to authenticity was waived by the Respondents when they failed to 
object at trial. Continental Western Insurance Co. v. KF5,', Inc., 30 Kan. App. 2d 1262, 1266, 59 
P.3d 1.4 (2002). rev. denied. 275 Kan. 963 (2003). Furthermore, the court erred in refusing to find 
that Exhibit 50 contained the General Conditions that were a part of the subcontracts, yet holding 
Johnson and Egan responsible based on the duty that was only found in Exhibit 50. 
Johnson's argument that I.R.E. 1004(3) precludes admission of Exhibit 50 is disingenuous. 
First of all, no objection on that ground was made at the trial, so any such objection is waived. 
Moreover, l.R.E. 1004(3) does not apply in this instance. There was never any showing that the 
original was in control of the party against whom offered, i. e., Johnson, FoxhoIlow, and/or the 
Fergusons. Therefore, I.R.E. 1004(3) simply does not apply. Furthermore, under LR.E. 1003, a 
duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless there is a genuine issue concerning 
authenticity or "continuing effectiveness of the original. or admission of the duplicate instead of the 
APPILI.;\NTS RIPLY BRILF ~ 15 
98-207176 
original \vould be unfltir." Again, Respondents made no such showing in this case and, as noted, 
simply did not object on authcnticity or any other grounds to the admission of Exhibit 50. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COlJRT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING 
DAMAGES AGAINST THE FERGUSONS. 
Harris' arguments on this issue \\'erc initially discussed in Appellant's Briefat 22-25. They 
consisted of five main points: 
First the trial court found Harris' unjust enrichment claim against Ferguson was based on 
Foxhollow's failure to submit invoices from Pro Rentals and Western States in a timely manner. R. 
1237-38 ['J 2(b)]. Appellant's Brief at 
Second, the trial court also found Harris never received the Pro Rentals or Western States 
invoices from Foxhollow, Egan or Johnson. R. 1224-25 [~:~r A( 1 )(p)-(q)]. Appellant's Brief at 23. 
Third, Judge St. Clair's decision shows the lessors remained unpaid, and that judgment 
against Harris was entered for those amounts. St Clair Decision at 4,7,14-15 and 21. Moreover, 
Ferguson admitted Egan's signature appeared on a Ferguson invoice and that Foxhollow billings 
went through Egan for review before submission to Harris. Tr. 599:8-24. Appellant's Brief at 23. 
Fourth, the court rejected evidence offered by Harris that Ferguson told Harris' job 
superintendent that Ferguson was withholding supplier and lessor invoices from Harris. R. 1255 ['J 
I( 1 )(0], The com1 ruled that assuming the conversation occurred, it was not evidence of fraud but 
merely put Harris on notice that all invoices had not been submitted. R. 1258 [~2(d)]. However, 
the "putting Harris on notice" rationale fails, because the progress payments had already been made 
and the damages already resulted. In other words, Ferguson was putting Harris on notice the contract 
had already been breached, and the "notice" came after damages had accrued. At a minimum, this 
shows Ferguson's acquiescence in fraud or other wrongdoing of the corporation. Appellant's Brief 
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Fifth. Harris cited case law discussing personal liability of corporate officers who participate 
or acquiesce in fraud or othcr wrongdoing of the corporation. Appellant's Brief at 24. Harris also 
cited case law showing the court erred in ruling Harris had to first pierce the corporate veil in order 
to hold Ferguson personally liable. Appellant's Brief at 24. 
Finally. Harris cited statutory law showing the Ferguson partnership and Michael Ferguson 
were liable for Kym Ferguson's fraudulent conduct as well. Appellant's Briefa124-25. 
In response. Ferguson claimed that even if the conversation between Harris' job 
superintendent and Ferguson took place, thejob superintendent testified he already knew Foxhollow 
had not turned in all of the billings. Ferguson Brief at 20-21. Ferguson adds that Kym Ferguson 
testified he did not know billings and invoices were to be turned into Harris and was unaware of any 
unpaid billings except one from Pro Rental as of the time he resigned from Foxhollow. Ferguson 
Briefat 21. Ferguson argues that ifFoxhollow intentionally withheld billings and invoices, Ferguson 
vvould not have paid the Pro Rental billing. nor would Egan have turned in the invoices or payroll; 
rather, all billings and invoices would have been stopped. Ferguson Brief at 21 
However, it is of no consequence that Harris' job superintendent already knew that 
Foxhollow had 110t turned in all billings as of the time the conversation between the superintendent 
and Ferguson occurred. That is what precipitated the conversation in the first place. If the job 
superintendent had not known billings had been withheld. he would have had no reason to confront 
Ferguson about the problem. In addition. the fact that some billings were paid does not preclude the 
fact that F oxho Ilow wi thheld other bi II ings. Moreover. Ferguson's argument that Harris cannot show 
detrimental reliance because it continued to pay payroll and equipment suppliers after it became 
aware that invoices had been withheld fails as \vell, because the damage had already been done. 
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Finally, Kym Ferguson's denial of knowledge that billings were to be submitted to Harris is 
belied hy his own trial testimony concerning a Ferguson invoice: 
Q. Would you turn to your Exhihit Trip N. 
A. N as in Nancy? 
Q. Correct. 
A. (Witness complies.) Okay. 
Q. Do you see your signature at the hottom of Exhihit of the 
first page in Exhibit Triple N'? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you identify whose signature that is in the middle of the 
description column'? 
A. On the first page? 
Q. Yes. sir. 
A. It looks like Dave Egan, but I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with Dave Egan's signature? 
A. Somewhat. 
Q. Because he was your business associatefor a while, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. If indeed that is David Egan's signature on this exhibit, can 
you explain why his signature would be on a Ferguson 
Trucking invoice? 
A. Because it was handed to him to be submitted to Scott 
Harris. 
Q. Okay. So this is, I guess, a notation system that you 
gentlemen decided upon to ensure or to show that you had 
handed it over to Dave Egan and in turn for him to hand it to 
Scott Harris: is that --
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A. I don't think so. I think thars Scott lIan'is' tracking deal, not 
Q. Well. but Scott Harris wouldn't have put Dave Egan's 
signature on there. I'm, I'm trying to - you indicated that, 
that you think that this is Dave Egan' s signature just to show 
that he's acknowledging receipt from you; is that correct? 
A. He's acknowledging that he approved the billing to be 
handed to Scott Harris. 
Q. Oh, okay. So this is an. an approval mark that Dave Egan 
would have put on there, which would indicate, okay, this is 
okay to submit to Harris Incorporated; is that what it is? 
A. That's the way I understand it was supposed to work. 
Q. Okay. All right. 
T r. 599: 1-600:20 (emphasis added). 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 55/55-A. 
The court refused to admit Exhibit 55/55-A due to concerns of accuracy and late disclosure. 
Tr. 102:22-103 :8: 109:22-1 10:6. 
However, as to the accuracy concern, Scott Harris had already provided all foundational 
testimony necessary to admit the exhibit as a business record. Tr. 93: 10-95:5; 95:20-96:8. 
As to the non-disclosure ground, the court abused its discretion in not admitting the exhibit 
for several reasons. First. most ifnot all of the documents that were the subject of the non-disclosure 
issue were provided to Respondents' counsel over one year before formal discovery requests were 
served by Respondents. Tr. 148: 13-149: 11. Second, all tile materials were produced for 
Respondents' counsel in conjunction with Scott Harris' deposition duces tecum. Tr. 139: 17-140:2; 
148: 13-149: 11; 151: 14-20. Third, the exhibit which the trial court refused to admit was merely an 
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update from a prior exhibit submitted into exhibit binders in accordance with the pre-trial order. 
Tr. 97:23-99: I O. Therefore. at a minimum, the court should have at least admitted so much of the 
exhibit as was in the trial exhibit binder. Finally, the court's ruling in this regard was inconsistent 
in that the court admitted another trial exhibit in spite of Respondents objections over late or no 
disclosure. Tr. I 18. The court's inconsistent rulings were error when it refused to admit one 
document on the same grounds to which admission of another document was allowed. 
In response. Johnson merely argues that the trial court correctly refused to admit the exhibit 
because the discovery rules require seasonable supplementation and because 11arris fai led to comply 
with the scheduling order. Johnson Brief at . Ferguson's response adopts by reference 
Johnson's response and otTers no additional input. Ferguson Brief at 17. 
However, Johnson's argument that implies Harris did not seasonally supplement discovery 
responses fails in light of Harris' providing most. ifnot all, of the relevant documents over one year 
before the Respondents served formal discovery requests, and in light of Harris' deposition duces 
tecum at which time all file materials were provided. Johnson fails to discuss these matters at all in 
its brief. 
Furthermore. the court excused compliance with the scheduling order in admitting Exhibit 
53. and should have done likewise and admitted Exhibit 55-A. Again. Respondents do not address 
this issue at all. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HARRIS, INC.'S 
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Harris' contentions in this regard are initially discussed in Appellant's Briefat 26-27. Harris 
contends the court erred in failing to f~nd Foxhollow as an agent of Johnson. 
The trial court found that all of Egan's actions were taken as Johnson's agent and 
Foxhollow's employee. R. 1253 [~2(d)]. The court also found that Foxhollow completed work on 
-~---- ------------- ---------~--- --------------~-- ----~----~--~-
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the Fremont Project on behalf of Johnson. R. J 246 ['i G( 1 )( e) 1. Finally, the court found "Johnson 
was bound to provide excavation, filling. grading, culvert and asphalt concrete paving on the 
Fremont Projeet." R. 1240 [,1 E(I)(a)J. Exhibit 2}, as noted, shows Foxhollow did that work and 
that Johnson was credited for at least some of the work. 
Therefore, the court should have amended its findings and conclusions to add that Foxhollow 
was also Johnson's agent on the Fremont Project. Such a finding was critical in light of the court's 
difTieulties in determining whether unpaid invoices pertained to Johnson's subcontract, Foxhollow's 
subcontract. or both. ,<';ee generally Appellant's Brief at 18-20, 26. 
I Iowever, in ruling on the motion to amend findings and conclusions, the court did not even 
discuss the agency vel non of Foxhollow. 
In response. Johnson argues the court determined Harris may have proved breach of contract 
by Johnson, but failed to prove any damages. Johnson Brief at 23. There is no discussion from 
Johnson as to whether the court erred in failing to find Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson as well. 
The Ferguson Respondents merely adopt by reterence Johnson's response on this issue and offer no 
additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 17. 
The court's crror in ruling that Harris failed to prove any damages was discussed earlier. See 
supra at 3-13. Moreover, a trial court is reversed on appeal for failure to find on every material issue 
unless such finding would not af1ect the judgment entered. Doe v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 907, 71 P.3d 
1040. 1054 (2003). The Respondents did not discuss at all whether the court erred in failing to find 
Foxhollow was an agent ofJolmson. This was clearly a material issue, given the court's apparent 
difficulty in apportioning damages between the Johnson contract and the Foxhollow contract, even 
though the evidence clearly showed Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson as well. 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES ANI) 
COURT COSTS TO JOHNSON A(;AINST HARRIS. 
Harris' initial argument on this issue is f(mnd in Appellant's Brief at I. It consists of 
five main points: 
First the gravamen of Harris' claims against Johnson was fraud. not a commercial 
transaction. Appellant's Brief at 28-29. 
Second, the court erred in awarding costs and fees after finding Johnson was not the overall 
prevailing party and that Johnson was unsuccessful in his defense. A non-prevailing party has no 
right to recovery of attorney fees or court costs. Hackelf v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,265, 706 P.2d 
13 1376 (Ct. App. 1985). Appellant's Brief at 29. 
Third. Johnson's memorandum of costs fails to itemize the fees and costs claimed. 
Appellant's Brief at 29. 
Fourth, Johnson' s aHidavit in support offees failed to address the factors found in Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure (LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Appellant's Brief at 29-30. 
Fifth. the court erroneously based its decision on its belief that Harris failed to sufficiently 
delineate between damages caused by the Johnson subcontract and damages caused by the 
Foxhollow subcontract. Appellant's Brief at 30-31. 
In response, Johnson asserts the court found Harris' claims were from a commercial 
transaction and under a contract pursuant to Idaho Code (I.c.) § 12-120(3), and that the court's 
decision should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Johnson Briefat 24-25. Johnson adds 
that in determining who was the prevailing party, the court should not focus on tallying issues or 
counts in a complaint but should evaluate the results in relation to the relief sought by each party. 
Johnson Briefat 24. Johnson further adds that it prevailed against Harris on all counts as to damages 
as is therefore the prevailing party. Johnson Brief at 23. 
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However, the fact remains that the court found Johnson was not the overall prevailing party; 
therefore, Johnson is not entitled to attorney fees and court costs at all. Hackett, 109 Idaho at 265, 
706 P.2d at 1376. Johnson ll1iled to cross-appeal the court's ruling in this regard. Moreover, 
Johnson provides no responsive argument whatsoever to Harris' contentions that it failed to itemize 
the attorney time and t~liled to address the Rule 54(e)(3) tactors. 
POINT NIN·E 
THE COlJRT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COlJRT COSTS TO THE FERGlJSONS AGAINST HARRIS. 
As discussed at pp. 31-35 of the Appellant' s Briet~ Harris contends the court erred 111 
awarding attorney fecs and court costs against Harris and in favor of the Fergusons. Harris cites four 
basic points in support of this contention: First. the Fergusons were not a prevailing party. Second, 
the gravamen of the action was not a commercial transaction. Third, a certain release signed by Kym 
Ferguson precludes recovery by the Fergusons. Finally, the Fergusons' motion for costs and fees 
was detective. 
Fergusons Not a Prevailing Party 
The Fergusons concede that Harris prevailed on their counterclaim which, in light of the 
release, the court found to be frivolous and accordingly deducted a certain amount of attorney fees 
claimed by the Fergusons. Ferguson Brief at 28-29. The Fergusons contend that Kym Ferguson 
successfully defended Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable 
for fraud. Ferguson Brief at 27-28. (That shows the gravamen of the action was tort, not a 
commercial transaction, as discussed further below.) The Fergusons further argue that the court 
granted summary judgment for them on all of Harris' claims, none of which were pursued at trial on 
the merits, and that Harris docs not appeal from the summary judgment or to the court. Ferguson 
Brief at 27. 
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The Fergusons' arguments notvvithstanding. they were not a prevailing party. Fergusons' 
argument that Harris did not appeal from the summary judgment or the court flies in the face of 
Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 17. Under that rule. the notice ofappeaJ is deemed to include all "final 
judgments. orders and decrees entered after the judgment, order or decree appealed from." LA.R. 
17(e)(1)(C). 
Simply put, there was no overall prevailing party as betwccn the Fergusons and Harris. After 
trial. and following the court's post-trial rulings on various summary judgment motions made prior 
to trial. all of Fergusons' claims against Harris had been dismissed. and all of Han is' claims against 
the Fergusons had been dismissed. Consequently, there was no overall prevailing party, and neither 
I lanis nor the Fergusons were entitled to attorney fees against the other. See Appellant's Brief at 
31. 
The court itself acknowledged that before trial. "Harris, Inc. dismissed its contract-based 
claims against the Fergllsons." R. 1541. Following the trial, and after Harris had abandoned its 
contract-based claims against the Fergusons. the court "dismissed" those same claims in the post-
trial decision on summary judgment. R. 1164. But also following trial. the court dismissed the 
Fergusons' counterclaim against Harris in its entirety finding that a certain release signed by Kym 
Ferguson "nullified" the Fergusons' counterclaim and that as a result, the Fergusons' entire 
counterclaim was ·'frivolous." R. 1541, 1542. See generally Appellant's Brief at 31-33. 
Therefore, with no overall prevailing party, the court erred in awarding attorney fees and 
court costs to the Fergusons. Mere dismissal 01'£1 claim before trial does not render the party against 
whom the claim was made the prevailing party. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 692, 
682 P.2d 640. 645 (CL App. 1984). on appeal afierfee award rev 'd. 115 Idaho 281. 766 P.2d 751 
(1988); P.N. Cedar, Inc. v. D & G Shake Co., 110 Idaho 561, 569, 716 P.2d 1333, 1341 (et. App. 
1986). 
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Gravamen Not a Commercial Transaction. 
The court furthcr erred in holding the gravamen of the case "arose out of a commercial 
transaction:' R. I There Wll5' no contract between Ferguson lind HlIrris other titan the 
agreement which the court found was covered by the release! Moreover, the court itself 
acknowledged that all of Harris' claims which \vould form the basis of a commercial transaction 
between Harris and the Fergusons had beenllballdoned prior to tria/. R. 1536-37, 1541. See also 
Appellanfs Brief at 
Even the Fergusons acknowledge that prior to trial, Harris dismissed its contract-based claims 
against them. Ferguson Brierat 27. They also concede that the only issue on which they prevailed 
was a tort cause of action Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold Kym Ferguson 
personally liable for fraud. Ferguson Brief at 27-28. 
Even the court conceded that the attorney fees it awarded the Fergusons against Harris arose 
"out of the Fergllsons' involvement with Foxhollow and the Fergusons' subcontract with Foxhollow 
on the Fremont Project." R. 1544 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the commercial transaction 
cited by the court as the "gravamen" of the case upon which fees were awarded against Harris to 
Fergllsons was betvveen Fergusons and another party, not Hani s. Awarding attorney fees on thi s 
basis was clearly error. because in order to apply I.e. § 12-120, the commercial transaction forming 
the basis of the award had to be between Harris and the Fergusons. See Beco Construction Co. v. 
J-U-B Engineers. Inc .. 145 Idaho 719, 726,184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). 
The trial court specifically held that the only issue remaining for trial as to the Fergusons was 
Hanis' fraud claim against Kym Ferguson and its related unjust enrichment claim. R. 1158, 1162. 
See also Appellant's Brief at 32-33. The court further noted that Kym Ferguson successfully 
defended against Harris' attempts to pierce the corporate veil and hold him individually liable. R. 
1541. Avoidance of such liability can only be in the context of tort. Therefore, the court erred in 
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awarding any attorney fees for trial time spent by the Fergusons' attorney, because the entirety of the 
trial time was in defending against tort claims; it had nothing whatsoever to do with commercial 
transactions which the court held were between the Fergusons and Foxhollow, not Harris. Beco 
Construction, 145 Idaho at 726, 184 P.3d at 851 (holding party seeking attorney fees under I.e. § 
120 not entitled to fees incurred after contract claim dismissed). Clearly, the gravamen of the 
case as it proceeded to trial was tort not contract. 
The Fergusons cite Blimka v. A1y Weh Wholesaler. L.L.C, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 597 
(2007) and Leftunich v. Key Bank National Associal ion, 14 I Idaho 362, 109 P .3d 1 104 (2005) 
appeal afier remand 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008) in support oftheir contention that they are 
entitled to fees in spite ofthe fact their entire trial defense related to a tort cause of action. However, 
both the Blimka and Letlunich cases are distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
In Blhnka, the court held the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney fees on a fraud 
claim which sought damages as a result of a commercial transaction. Blimka. 143 Idaho at 729, 152 
P.3d at 600. However, in Blimka. all of the plaintifTs causes of action arose from afralldillent 
commercial transaction; i.e., the commercial transaction itself was fraudulent from its inception. 
Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26, 152 P.3d at 596-97. In Blimka, the defendants misrepresented the 
amount and quality of certain goods to be shipped to the plaintiff. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725, 152 
P.3d at 596. In reliance 011 those misrepresentations, the pJaintiffwired payment to the defendants. 
Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26, 152 P.3d at 596-97. When the goods arrived, the shipment was short 
some 10,000 items, and the items were not the quality represented. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 725-26, 
P.3d at 596-97. Since the plaintiff sought damages resulting from that fraudulent transaction, 
the court awarded attorney fees under I.e. § 1 120(3). Blimka, 143 Idaho at 729, 152 P.3d at 600. 
In Lettunich, the court likewise considered a fraud claim based entirely on a commercial 
transaction. In that case, the plaintiff applied to the bank for three loans, and the bank responded 
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with commitment letters. Lettunhk 141 Idaho at 109 P at 1107. The plaintiff signed the 
commitment letters and in reliance thereon. purchased certain cattle. Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 366, 
109 P.3d at II OS. Therealter. the bank refused to proceed with the loans. so plaintiff sued the bank 
fiJr fj'au(i. breach of contract. and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lettunich, 
141 Idaho at 366, 109 P.3d at 11 OS. The Leffunich court held that. since al/ of the plaintiff's claims 
arose from the alleged misrepresentations by the defendants, al/ of plaintiff s claims were integral 
to the commercial transaction, and thus were within the scope of I.C. § 1 120. 
Thus, in both Blimka and Lettunich. the ell tire commercial transaction arose as a result of 
alleged misrepresentations by the defendants. By contrast, in this case, the commercial transaction 
did Ilot arise as a result of alleged misrepresentations by Ferguson. The fraud took place after the 
subcontracts with L.N. Johnson and Foxhollow were signed and during the course of work called 
for under the contracts. There was no signed contract with Ferguson. Indeed, at trial, counsel for 
Ferguson and counsel for Harris stipulated the fraud claim was the only claim pending between 
Harris and Ferguson. Blimka does not stand fiJI" the proposition that fraud not based on a commercial 
transaction comes within the scope of I.e. § I 120. Here, the oral contract between Harris and 
Ferguson was not a commercial transaction which involved tOliiollS conduct, as in Blimka. 
As noted, the only issue on which the action proceeded to trial as against the Fergusons was 
a fraud claim. There was not fraudulent commercial transaction which itself was the basis for 
Harris' fraud claims against the Fergusons. There was simply no contract between Harris and the 
Fergusons until after the events giving rise to Han'is' fraud claim against the Fergusons. Blimka does 
not stand for the proposition that fraud not based on a commercial transaction comes within the 
scope of I.C. § 12-120. There was simply no contract between Han'is and Ferguson other than the 
oral contract which the court held was covered by the release. 
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Release Precludes Recovery, 
The court erred in awarding any costs and attorney fees whatsoever to the Fergusons, given 
the plain language of a certain release agreement, offered and admitted as Exhibit 39, without any 
objection from the Fergusons' attorney, Tr. 190:22-191 :5. The plain language of this release covers 
all claims for costs and fees by any of the Fergusons. 
In their response, the Fergusons acknowledge that the release "pertained to damages arising 
in any way out of any work perf(xmed by the undersigned (Ferguson) at those certain construction 
projects in Rigby, Idaho Ithe Jefferson Project] and Ashton, Idaho [the Fremont Project] in which 
the undersigned and the releasees [Harris 1 were involved." Ferguson Brief at 31. The Fergusons 
then argue that the fraud action Harris asserted against Kym Ferguson had nothing to do with work 
the Fergusons performed on the Jetlcrson or Fremont Projects! Ferguson Brief at 31-32. 
The court ruled the release did not preclude an attorney fee award against Harris, because the 
fees avvarded arose out of Fergusons' work on Foxhollow's subcontract, and not on any of 
Fcrgusons' work {ex Harris, Inc. R. 1544. Again, the court acknowledges the attorney fees awarded 
did not involve a commercial transaction between Harris and the Fergusons, but rather Foxhollow 
and the Fergusons. Given that finding, the Fergusons were not entitled to fees and costs against 
Harris. Beco Construction, 145 Idaho at 726,184 P.3d at 851. 
Moreover. the plain terms of the release contained no such distinction as employed by the 
court and thus the court erred in refusing to apply the clear language of the release by awarding fees 
and costs against Harris, contrary to the plain terms of the release. 
The Release peliains to "any and air claims, "allY and air rights, "any and air costs, "any 
and air expense, and "any and air compensation whatsoever "which [Ferguson] now has or which 
may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way grow out of any and all ... economic, financiaL.or 
other damage, and the consequences thereo/resulting or to result/rom" the Jefferson and Fremont 
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Projects. Release (Trial Exhibit 39) at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover. the Release contains this 
language: "IUjndersigned has considered not only the ascertained damages and losses, but also the 
fact that consequence.';' not now ascertained may result from undersigned's participation in the 
af'(xementioned construction projects." Release at I. Clearly, this lawsuit and the litigation and 
costs incurred as a result, grew out of, resulted from, and were a consequence of Ferguson's 
participation in the Jefferson and Fremont Projects. Therefore. the Release covers Ferguson's claim 
for costs and fees. 
Moreover. the Release covers all claims for costs and fees by all of the Ferguson defendants. 
The Release was signed by Kym Ferguson d/b/a Ferguson Trucking. Release at It was signed by 
Kym Ferguson in this capacity on behalf of his agents as well. Release at 1. "Each partner is an 
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business." I.C. § 53-3-301(1). Therefore, in signing 
this Release on behalfofFerguson Trucking, Kym Ferguson also bound Michael Ferguson as well. 
Indeed. as the Court found, "Defendant D. Kym Ferguson testified that a release he signed with 
Harris covered any liabilities Ferguson might assert against Harris with regard to Ferguson's work 
on the Fremont Project." Harris Summary Judgment at 2 (emphasis added). Moreover, D. Kym 
Ferguson and Michael Ferguson were sued in their capacities as partners in Ferguson Farms d/b/a 
Ferguson Trucking. Complaint filed 08117/05 at 2 ,,6. 
If the court found the release precluded recovery for Ferguson in its counterclaim against 
Harris. the court should also have ttlund the release precluded Fergusons' claims against HalTis for 
attorney fees and court costs, because they arose from the same set of circumstances that gave rise 
to Fergusons' counterclaim against BalTis. 
Motion for Fees and Costs Defective. 
As noted at pp. 34-35 of Appellant's Brief. Fergusons' motion for costs and fees was 
defective as well. First of all, the memorandum of costs and attorney fees contained no discussion 
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of an v of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) from a brief assertion that Fergusons prevailed on all 
of Harris' claims. R. 131 1318. Appellant's Briefat 34. Likewise, Fergusons' briefin support of 
their motion t(]r fees contained no reference or discussion of the Rule 54( e)(3) factors. R. 1319-
1321. Appellant's Brief at 34. Finally, the affidavit of the Fcrgusons' attorney failed to discuss all 
of the Rule 54(e)(3) Hlctors. Appellant's Briefat 34-35. 
Incredibly. Fergusons' response in this regard is that they did not need to address all of the 
Rule 54(e)(3) factors! Ferguson Brief at 29. That assertion is directly contrary to Idaho law. The 
party seeking an award of tees must give the court sufficient information to enable the court to 
consider all of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), which the court is required to do. Lettunich v. 
Lelfunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, III P.3d 110, 120 (2005); Sun Valley Potato Growers. Inc. v. Texas 
Refinery Corp .. 139 Idaho 761. 769. 86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004); Hackel!, 109 Idaho at 264, 706 P.2d 
at 1372. The affidavit of counsel must address the Rule 54(e)(3) factors. lvfedical Recovery 
Serviees, L.L.c. v. Jones. 145 Idaho 106. 110, 175 P.3d 795. 799 (et. App. 2007). 
In addition, the Fergusons contend Harris should have raised this issue below. Ferguson 
Brief at 30. However. the court's decision as to costs and fees awarded to Ferguson is deemed 
included in the notice of appeal. tA.R. 17(e)( I )(C). Cl Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 35-36, 
624 P.2d 413, 417-18 (1981) (holding that "it is the rule in Idaho that neither an objection to findings 
nor a request or motion fiJr findings is a prerequisite to appellate review and such failure to bring the 
matter to the attention of the trial court docs not waive the right to bring it up on appeal"). In short, 
the Fergusons failed to give the court sutIieient information to allow it to adequately consider all of 
the factors of Rule 54(e)(3). Their failure to do so waives their right to attorney fees. 
POINT TEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HARRIS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
H-arris' motion for a new trial was based in part on the trial court's refusal to award damages 
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on three grounds: (1) that Harris failed to prove damages; (2) that the evidence did not delineate 
whether the damages resulted f)'om the Johnson contract, the Foxhollow contract, or both; and (3) 
that the payments Harris sent to Johnson were not fiJr Johnson's work on the Fremont Project. The 
other grounds for Harris' motion for new trial were discussed in Harris' initial brief. See Appellant's 
Brief at 35-37. However. the damages-rclated grounds are the only grounds to which Johnson and 
the Fergusons offered any responsive argument. Johnson argues the court was COlTect in denying 
a new trial. because Harris testified at length about Harris' internal records but failed to produce 
supporting documentation. was not certain as to precise amounts, and gave speculative testimony 
with inconclusive and confusing exhibits. Johnson Brief at 25-26. The Fergusons adopt by 
reference Johnson's assertions on this issue, and offer no additional argument. Ferguson Brief at 18. 
Each of these points have been discussed in great detail in Harris' briefing. See Appellant's 
Briefat 9-18 and supra at 3-13 [on failure to prove damages]; Appellant's Briefat 18-20 and supra 
at 10-11 [on delineation between Johnson and Foxhollow subcontracts]; and Appellant's Briefat 20, 
supra at 12-13 [on payments sent to Johnson]. 
The Respondents are simply wrong when they assert the court was correct in denying the new 
trial on the grounds that Harris did not produce supporting documentation along with Harris business 
records. Inspection by the opposing party of the underlying materials is not a prerequisite to a 
summary's admission as a business record. Beco Corp. v. Roherts' & S'ons Construction Co .. 114 
Idaho 704. 760 P.2d 1120 (1988), overruled on other ground<;, Highland Farms. Inc. v. Johnson, 119 
Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990). Once the business records were admitted, they became substantive 
evidence of damages. This substantive evidence was left unrebutted by the Defendants and should 
not have been disregarded by the court. inreDoe, 142 Idaho 594, 598, 130P.3d 1132, 1136(2006); 
Wood v. Hoglund 131 Idaho 700, 703. 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1988); Campbell v. Campbell, 120 Idaho 
394.399,816 P.2d 350, 355 (et. App.1991); Olsen v. Hawkins, 90 Idaho 28,37,408 P.2d 462,467 
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( 1965). 
The court's failure to award damages was reversible error, because in so ruling, the court 
ignored the unrebutted and credible testimony of Scott Harris as he testified from Harris' business 
records. An order denying new trial on damages will be reversed where the plaintiff was a credible 
witness, and his unimpeached testimony was not inherently improbable. Dinneen v. Finch. 100 
Idaho 620. 626-27, 603 P.2d 575. 581-82 (1979). 
As noted, Respondents failed to address any of the other issues cited by Harris concerning 
the court's denial of Harris' motion for new trial. Accordingly. Harris stands by the arguments in 
its initial brief. See Appellant's Brief at 7. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Respondents assert they are entitled to attorney fees and court costs on appeal pursuant to 
LA.R. 41 and I.e. § 1 120(3). However. as shown below, neither 10hnson nor the Fergusons are 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Johnson is not entitled to attorney fees, because lohnson failed 
to cite the appropriate statute under which it asserts its claim for attorney fees. Ferguson is not 
entitled to attorney fees. because Ferguson cited a commercial transaction statute, I.e. § 12-120(3), 
as the basis for its attorney fee claim; however. as discussed above, there was no commercial 
transaction between Ferguson and Harris other than the transaction covered by the release (Trial 
Exhibit 39). Moreover. neither Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because neither was 
the prevailing paliy in the proceedings below. 
tA.R. 41 is a procedural rule and provides no independent basis for attorney fees on appeal. 
Parks ide 5,'choofs, Inc. v. Broncho Elite Arts & Athletics, LLe, 145 Idaho 176, 179, 177 P.3d 390, 
393 (2008). Therefore, to be awarded attorney fees on appeal, a party must refer to an appropriate 
statutory provision that authorizes such an award. Garcia v. Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898, 899, 174 P.3d 
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868, 869 (2007). Attorney will be denied on appeal where the party fails to specify the statute 
or contractual provision allowing an award of attorney fees. Parks ide Schools, Inc., 145 Idaho at 
179, 177 P.3d at 393. 
I.e. § 1 121 is the appropriate statutory authority for attorney fees on appeal where the party 
contends the appeal was frivolous. "Attorney can be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal 
under Section 1 121 only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation." Bird v. Bidwell. 147 Idaho 350, 353, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009). Attorney fees 
can be awarded on appeal under I.e. § 1 121 "only if the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 779, 186 P.3d 630,635 
(2008). 
10hnson claims it is entitled to attorney tees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41 on the grounds 
the appeal was "frivolously brought." 10hnson Briefat 27-28. However, instead of citing I.e. § 12-
121, the appropriate statute tor frivolous appeals, 10hnson cited I.e. § 12-120(3). This error 
precludes 10hnson from an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 10hnson failed to cite the 
proper statute for frivolous appeals. Moreover, the court found 10hnson was not "the overall 
prevailing party:' that its defense was unsuccessful, and that Johnson did not "predominantly" 
prevail. R. 1538. 1540. Johnson has not cross-appealed from this decision, so it remains a non-
prevailing party. A non-prevailing party is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Gooding County 
v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,205,46 P.3d 18,22 (2002). 
Fergusons' request for attorney fees on appeal is flawed as well. Ferguson cites LA.R. 41 
and I.e. § 12-120(3) in support. Ferguson Brief at 32. However, there was no commercial 
transaction between Ferguson and Han'is other than the oral agreement which, as the court found, 
was covered by the release in Exhibit 39. As discussed supra, the release applies to all expenses, 
present and future, that arise in any way out of the circumstances of this case. 
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In determining whether to award attorney fees on appeal, the court must consider "the entire 
course of the litigation .... ·· Vendelin v. ('ostco ~Wh()lesale ('orp., 140 Idaho 416, 434,95 P.3d 34, 52 
(2004). "Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact. attorney fees may not be awarded under 
I.C. ~ 1 121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434,95 P.3d at A party is not 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal if the appeal "presented a legitimate question for this Court to 
address." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ol Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87. 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 
(2007). "When there are fairly debatable questions attorney fecs are not awardable pursuant to [I.C. 
§ I 121]." National Union Fire Insurance ('0. v. Dixon, ] 41 Idaho 537. 542, 112 P.3d 825. 830 
(2005). "Ordinarily. attorncy fees will not be awarded [under I.e. § 1 121] where the losing party 
brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented." Chi ... ·holm v. Twin 
Fa/l..." County. 139 Idaho 131. 136, 75 P.3d 185. 190 (2003). 
In this case. the issues presented on appeal were genuine issues of law, fairly debatable, and 
presented legitimate questions for this cOllli to consider. Those issues include, inter alia, the 
following: 
1. The trial court's refusal to award damages in spite of substantive. competent evidence 
that went unrebutted: 
2. . rhe co urt' s refusal to award damages in sp i te 0 f su bstanti ve, com petent evi dence that 
gave precise amounts of damages claimed; 
3. The COlirt' s refusal to award damages in spite of the uncontradicted testimony of Scott 
Harris based on personal knowledge and experience in the industry; 
4. The court's refusal to award damages on the grounds that the court could not 
distinguish between damages attributable to the principal (Johnson) and the principal's agent (Egan! 
Foxhollow); 
APPILLAI\T'S REPLY BRIIT - 34 
98-207~ 176 
5. l'he court's refusal to consider the General Conditions (Exhibit 50) due to concerns 
with authenticity when stIch objections were waived: 
6. The courf s awarding costs and to Johnson after it found Johnson was not the 
overall prevailing party: 
7. The court's awarding costs and fCes to Ferguson under I.C. § 1 120 when it found 
no contract or commercial relationship between Ferguson and Harris which was not covered by the 
release (Exhibit 39): and 
8. The court's failing to find Foxhollow was also an agent of Johnson after finding Egan 
functioned as an agent of Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow. 
Accordingly. for the reasons stated. neither Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLlJSION 
Numerous errors on the pmi of the trial court require a reversal of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. and vacating the judgments entered. First. the trial court erred in refusing to 
award damages to Harris, in spite of Scott Harris' testimony concerning damages and the 
documentary evidence admitted as I-farris business records which remained unimpeached. The 
documentary evidence gave precise figures as to the damages incurred by Harris. Harris also gave 
competent testimony based on his experience as to other items of damages claimed. Second, the trial 
court erred in refusing to consider the General Conditions to Contract, Trial Exhibit 50, after any 
objections to authenticity were waived, especially after finding duties and responsibilities that could 
stem only from Exhibit 50. Third, the trial court erred in not awarding damages against the 
Fergusons in spite of the documentary evidence of such damages that was also admitted without 
objection. Fourth. the court erred in refusing to admit Plaintiffs Exhibit 55i55-A, because 
supporting invoices had indeed been submitted to Respondents' counsel even before formal 
discovery. and were also made available at Scott Harris' deposition duces tecum. Fifth, the court 
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erred in refusing to amend findings and conclusions to lind Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson, 
after findi Egan was an agent of Johnson and an employee of Foxhollow. Sixth, the court erred 
in awarding attorney and court costs to Johnson after finding Johnson was not the overall 
prevailing party. Seventh, the court erred in awarding attorney lees and court costs to Ferguson 
against I farris when the only commercial transaction between Ferguson and Harris was, as the eourt 
found, covered by the release (Trial Exhibi(19). Finally, given these errors. the court further erred 
in denying Harris' motion II)!' new trial. 
RESPECTFUU S SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
PI intiffs, 
FOX HOLLOW CONSTRUCTION & 
TROCKING, INC., an 
t on, DAVID EGAN, DEMIAN 
EGANi HARRIS, INC., an Idaho 
tion; and UNITED FIRE & 
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Iowa 
tion, 
Defendants. 




FOX HOLLOW CONSTRUCTION & 
TROCKING, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, DAVID EGAN, DEMIAN 
EGAN; HARRIS, INC., SCOTT 
HARRIS; an Idaho Corporation; 
and UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION l\ND ORDER 
CONSOLIDATED CASES 
Jefferson County 
Case No. CV-03-314 
:MEMORANDUM DECISION ~1) ORDER 
Fremont County 
Case No. CV-03-213 
1 
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT 
On 00 I 1 er "p 
a rr) campI int Ii Count CV-O ~213, 
and 1 on cas CV-03-
14, t Hollow Cons ru ion and 
" Demi fter 
11 1.'1 " FI) , r s fter 
colI ") , and Uni 
(hereaft r ~United") see e of $4,7 7.90 for 
rented Fox Hollow for us in truction work at the Ashton 
School in Fremont rand recovery of $3,023.11 
for e rented Fox Hollow for use in construction work 
at: the School in Jefferson A jury was not 
the intiff. 
On 30, 2003, Harris and filed a 
mot on to di SS. Tbe lClot s n been noticed for" hearing, 
and no answer has been filed those defendants No appearance 
has been filed by defendants Fox Hollow a the . On June 27, 
2003, the cases were consolidated, with pleadings to be filed 
thereafter the Jefferson County case. 
The aints seek recove of the above specified rental 
amounts under Count I from Fox Hc·llow based on of written 
contract and from the s based on a written guarantee, under 
Count II from Fox Hollow and Ha s based on oral promissory 
estoppel, under Count III from all defendants based on unjust 









ted ed on i Itiorks 
L 54~ 25 
ion, J:'remont 
0.00 and as of profits 
on ch of t 
a motion for iel 
Unit . The ion was 
ts Fox Hollow oyees David and 
f Pro als employee Jones, with 
of the United's two bonds, invoices for 
to Fox Hollow, two 13, 2002 certified 
letters from Pro Rentals' attorL·ey to s, an October 28, 2002 
letter from Harris in reply, and an October 17, 2002 letter from 
Pro ntal f attorney to United. 
On r 4, 003, t1 mot came on for hear~ng. Leave 
was granted without ection to United for filing an opposition 
memorandum 10 . Or October 4, 2003, United led an 
oppos ion memorandum and an affidavit of Scott Harris, with an 
attached copy of the back pa'}e of a Pro Rentals' equipment lease 
form. On r 9, 2003, Pea Rentals filed a reply memorandum 
and a motion to strike the affidavit of Scott Harris. 
Having considered the m()tion, the affidavits, and 
and oppos 1 memoranda and o.al argument, this Court 
renders the following decisien of 1 he pending motion, and 
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i 
1ude hat Pr:o 1 have ial j 
V Un , 7 7.90 in the 
r 0 11 n y case, wi 
s reasonable orney fees. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion fo ummary j 
gs, it 
n 11 be rendered forthwith 
ions r' 1 Il~ , 
with the fidavits, if any, show that there is no genu ne issue 
s to any rna ial fact and that th y is tl to 
j s a matter of law." Pule 56(c),I.R.C.P.; G & M Farms 
119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 p.2d 851, 853 
54 ( 991); 119 Idaho 99, 307, 
805 P.2d 1223, 1231 (1991); 126 
587, 590, 887 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ct.App.1994). 
motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts 
are libe lly construed favor of the 
Ent 113 Idaho 37, 40, 1(l'lt:: .LULJ 
Tusch 
/ ~ no" • \.L.7u//, 
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986) 
(rehea denied). Moreover, the court draws all reasonable 
factual inferences and conclusions in favor of the non-moving 
party. ______________________ ~ ________ ~~~~~, 125 Idaho 270, 
272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris v 
--------------~~--~~--~~~~~ 
_&_. __ W_e_1 ____ , 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992) 
ring denied) . 
!illhere the party moving £0.[ summary j 
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is not required 
4 
to t b of proo tri hmv 
that the 
on Y will 
0 t k v. Elde 6 Idaho 308, 
311 f d 7 L1'" " I 94) . burden has been 
me f ither an f i of the 's 
0 rty' vidence, the 
0 non t a 
issue for t al exis Id. 
Di fact will not urnmary j when the 
pa the motion ils to tablish the stence of an 
e senti. 1 of his case. V. Idaho 
Ser Sf Inc., 1 3 Idaho 937, 941-42, 854 P.2d 280, 284-85 
(Ct. .1993) (c1 tat omitted). On the hand, where 
admissibl facts e issues on all of the 
elements of caus of action, summary j must be ed. 
See 100 Idaho at 69, 593 P.2d at 404; 90 
Idaho at 326-27, 411 P.2d at 771-72. 
Rule 56(e) r I.R.C.P., regJires that both supporting and 
oppos affidavits be made on personal knowledge, set forth 
facts that would be ssible in evidence, and show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testi to the 
matters stated therein. [vloreo ver, 5sible opinions or 
conclusions do not satisfy th~ requirements for proof of material 
facts. Hecla M_ini . v S! ar-Mo Co., 122 Idaho 778, 783-
--------~~~~~~--~-~ ----------~~---
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78 f 8 d 11 97 1 00 ( 99 ) ; Evan 
10, f 796 P. d 87, 90 ( 1 90) , cert. den r 498 U.S. 
10 1) ; 10 Idaho 925, 9 0, 7 9 P.2d 
11 , 11 0, ( 1 86) , 479 U.S. 1007 (1986) . 
III. STATEMENT OF ~~TERIAL FACTS 
t u and most p e 
rna ct in favor of the oppos 
urmna.ry j , the Court nds the 11 material facts to 
s~ated in sworn aff ts, and exhibits which would be 
admi under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
This involves two lic work contracts. On June 13, 
2002, was awarded a construction contract by the Fremont 
County Joint School District or the construction of a new high 
chao in Ashton, I (hereafter ~Ashton Project"). On October 
18, 2001, Harris was awarded a construction contract by the 
T~ 
uc fcrson SchooJ Distr ct No. 251 for a Water Boost 
Station, Sewer Lift Station, and Water and Sewer Line 
Extension at the Rigby Hi School (hereafter "Rigby Project") 
As is red by Ie §54-1926, Harris obtained Payment Bond No. 
54-116191 from United for the Rigby project, and Payment Bond No. 
54-127467 from United for the Ashton project. 
In June, 2002, Harris contracted with Fox Hollow to perform 
work on both ects. Thereafter Fox Hollow rented various 
ces of equ from Pro Rentals for use in performing the 
i'1EtJ10Rp.NDUl'1 DECISION p~ND ORDE1. 6 
ub on work he two proj ct sites. 
1 wa o it equ 
Accord o and Jones, Pro 
Renta s invoice were to Fox Hollow but not on 
the on are follows: 
Invoice # Equipment Date Returned Amt. Billed 
4 9 60" or 6/18/0 $3,245.00 
25029 84" 18/02 $255.00 
27082 6" 8/1 /0 $411. 00 
27379 Skid Steer 9/3/02 $1,155.00 
27520 Skid Steer 9/3/02 $217.50 
Acco to the invoice attached to the affidavits, the 
last of any Pro Rentals equipment that had been rented to Fox 
Hollow was used at the Ashton project was a Case 1838 Skid Steer. 
(See invoice 27520) 
Acco to the affidavits of sand Jones, Pro 
Rentals invoices that were sent to Fox Hollow but not paid on the 
Project are as follows: 
Invoice # Equipment Date Returned Amt. Billed 
23497 Compactor 5/4/02 $48.70 
23832 Mini Excavator 5/9/02 $1,055.00 
23681 Compressor/Breaker 5/10/02 $99.20 
& Hose 
23759 Tractor w/loader 5/12/02 $252.00 
23873 Tractor Rental (no date given) $4.18 
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40 0 4" 1 (no e given) $187.95 
437 rr \,f / 0/0 8.25 
44 6" 5 1/02 $1,005.00 
4 " 5/27/02 $22.00 
4 4" Saw 5/29/02 $246.65 
~ invoi at ched to the affidavits, the L 
0 a s equ nt that had been rented to Fox 
Hollow wa the project WdS a Double Drum 0024 
0 on 18, 200 (See nvoice 15028) 
On S ember 13, 2002, Pro Rentals' attorney mailed two 
letters to Harris certified mail notifying Harris that Fox 
ow had not paid Pro Rentals $8.057.90 for equipment used at 
the Ashton project and $3,166.11 for equipment used at the Rigby 
ect. On same date Pro Rentals' attorney sent by regular 
mail copies of these two letters to Harris, United, Fox Hollow 
and each school district project owner. Although the envelopes 
attached to the Jones affidavit indicate the U. S. Postal Service 
gave a first notice to Harris on September 16 th and second notice 
on ember 26 th , the return receipt showing the actual delivery 
date is not in this record. The affidavit of Scott Harris states 
he received the letters in "mid-September, 2002." See Harris Aff. 
at 
Thereafter Harris paid some of the invoices, but Harris 
re ed to pay for equipment that was last used on either project 
more than 90 days from when Harris received notice. See Harris 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 8 
err on from 1 ter da 
00 " schedul " 
hi t fo equ 
proj 1, 00 Pro Rentals is 
8 0 HollOVJ fo 
hton the ect. 
s t t. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Pro Rentals' Motion to Strike Harris Affidavit. 
Pro Rentals seeks to strike the Harris ffidavit because 
affi in sition to a motion for summary judgment must be 
filed at least 14 days before he under Rule 56(c), 
I.R.C.P., and leave of court was not reques ed United when it 
requested time to file an oppo ition memorandum. Pro Rentals also 
argues that it did not consent to the late fil of an 
it ffidavit. Tucke Aff. at 
that Harris F'ox Hollow 
money to be used to pay third ies such a Pro Rentals, and 
there Fox Hollow ~was olerpaid." Also Harris' affidavit 
states that he received the September 13 th letters in "mid-
September, 2002." These fac ts are not material to a decision on 
pending motion for sUffi'nary judgment. Lastly the Harris 
affidavit attaches a copy of a back page from a Pro Rentals 
equipment lease. However, there is no foundation for Harris who 
is not an employee of eilher Pro Rentals (the lessor) nor Fox 
MEJvIORANDUi'-'l DECISION l\ND OF DER 9 
110'" (t ) r ar,y foundat on to 
how about the tached document, in 
ibl Further the i no 
any of the actual 
Ho Oltl r any of the id 
ummer of 199 Since no udice to 
1 from 1 t filing of the Harris 
on st must denied. 
B. Pro Rentals' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The 1 ller Act des for a federal works project 
subcont or materials ier to prosecute a claim for 
unpaid wo k or mat s used in a federal project against a 
bond supplied the contractor. In 1965 Idaho enacted 
the Public Contracts Bond Act, codified at I. C. §54 1925 et. 
• r referred to as a ~mini Miller Act." This Act was 
neled jn 1980 to that s iers of equipment used on 
state lic vwrks p ecls could also recover unpaid equipment 
rentals under the bond posted by the general contractor. 
I. C. §54-1927 requires subcontractors and materials 
suppliers, as a condition precedent to filing suit against the 
bond surety, to give 90 days notice to the contractor. It 
states: 
"Every claimant who has furnished labor or material or 
rented, leased, or otherwise supplied equipment in the 
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished tinder this 
act, and who has not been paid in full therefor before 
MEJvlORANDUM DECISION AND OEDER 10 
performed 
material or equipment was furnished for 
whom the labor was done or 
be served mailing the same or certified 
mail, postage prepaid, in an addressed to the 
contractor at any ace he maint an office or 
conducts his business or at his re idence. If (emphasis 
added) . 
Al "equipment" is rnent e on in the statute 
and at the conclusion, it is not expressly mentioned the 
inning of the 90 not sian. Constru the entire 
statut f his Court concludes tnat oversight, the 
Legislature omitted "e " from the second to last line of 
the ion of the statute undi;rlined above for sis. In 
other words the Legislature mednt that clause to re 
however, that any such cLlimant having a direct cant 
relationship with a subcontract or of the contractor furnishing 
such payment bond but no contr2ctual relationship expressed or 
ied with such contractoI shall not have a of action 
upon such payment bond unless [\ e has ven written notice to such 
contractor within ninety (90) c:ays from the date on which such 
claimant performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied 
the last of the material or eqLipment for which such claim is 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 11 
1 ) . 
1 ng I. C. 
4 o must be ived the 
o j 1 s i r within 90 
ect. Second, 
daho 1 int ing the statute as to 
whe1: r must ce fo ch of unpaid 
j ice aft the la used ce of 
it rty a fi t po noted above. As to 
the s cond po rgues that only one notice within 
90 p o rental equipment was used on the 
ect is sary. In opposition Harris argues that the 90 day 
od runs the t each piece of rental equipment is used. 
n s rt of their respective s the parties cite 
several federal decisions the Miller Act, and a few 
state cases from other jurisdictions. This Court has considered 
the ca es cit Unless scussed below, this Court has 
determined that the facts the cases are too different to be of 
any persuasive value in deciding this motion. 
Ashton Project 
Based on the Court's own research it appears that the 
similar federal Miller Act s teen interpreted by a few federal 
courts as requiring a materials supplier, and by analogy an 
equipment supplier, to just mai.1 the notice to the contractor 
tvlElvJORANDut1 DECISION AND ORDER 12 
90 1 tot mat al. Uni ed 
I. Lincoln Prod. Co. v. Greene Elec. Serv., 
4, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), ff'd 37 F.2d 207 
19 7); ~U~.~~_~~_~ ______ v_._C~o_n~t_i_r:_Ie_-_n_t __ l_____ -"'--_C-'---o_., 245 
E' upp. 87 (E. D. 19 ). One federal court has he that 
the contractor is red within 90 of last 
formed. Insulation Inc. v. Artco 
70 F. 1 40 (4 ttl Ci . 1 92) 
rul of the notice the 
contractor furthers the interest of the sure owner and 
contractor in being able to close out final of 
construction ects vIi worrying about unpaid rd ies 
whose notice was never received, such rule encourages contractors 
to refu e ance of certified or registered mail for several 
or entire to escape ing notice of unpaid claims under 
the Miller Act. In this case, it appears that Harris did not pick 
up certi ed letters from the Pocatello post 0 ce after 
notices from the post ce on September 16 th and September 26 th • 
ly, the post office then returned the certified letters 
to Pro Rentals' attorney on October 4, 2002 as being undelivered. 
For this reason, this Court questions the wisdom of the 4~ 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
On the rule ,:equiring only mailing by t 
claimant is subject to abuse if the claimant back dates his 
notice, or simply claims that hel.imely mailed the notice, when 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 13 
di res he mail 
t fi gi mail. This 
t t u qui i practi either 
imant: the the mail post office has an 
o he noti was actual mailed and 
t po t ffi I record of the 
i d noti i ract to pick up 
the with the I imant's noti nit. 
tha th Idaho slature intended that 
the cont i claimant's notice within 90 days of 
the equ being supp1 ed on job site, it must have 
intended th t the cont o for receiving mail, i.e., 
its post 0 be the date of . In this case it was at 
least as early s September 16, 2002, the date it attempted 
to Pro Renta Sf letters to Harris. Counting back 90 days from 
S ember 1 s June 18 th . 
On the Ashton project alJ of the rented used and 
for which paid is currently was last used between June 18, 
2002 and September 3, 2002. Since all are within the 90 notice 
period, Pro Rentals has complied with the notice condition in I. 
c. §54 1927. The uncont cted facts establish the reasonable 
amount owed to Pro RentaJ for used at the Ashton 
project is $5,283.50. However, the complaint in the Fremont 
County case only alleges $4,757.90 as unpaid principal before 
adding tnLerest. Therefore partial summary judgment should be 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 14 
1 Court IV against United for 
with i onabl att fees. 
t becomes ne sary to consider whe r 1. 
c. e 90 day notice for each ece of 
renta not , or only one notice within 90 days 
th o d aJ equ 
upreme Court has ruled that the sions of I. 
c. § 4 1 7 follow those of the federal Miller Act. Les Schwab 
Tire Centers of ~nc., v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 
(1974) . 
st, in enacting the to I. C. §54-2719, which added 
the word \\ " to the statute, the I slature stated the 
was made to provide suppliers of equipment with the same 
claim ri as s iers of labor and materials. If, as Harris 
argues, he slature deliberat excluded the "equipment." 
then, unlike suppliers of materi~l and labor, providers of 
would not be required to give ninety days notice at 
all. However, in light of the stated purpose for adding 
"equipment" to the statute, as stated by this Court above, it is 
unlikely that the I slature intended this result. 
An inspection of comparable statutes in other states reveals 
t t some states include the word equipment in the ninety day 
notice requirement. For example, the Rhode Island §37-12-2 
statute reads: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 15 
sha 1 
mater I or 
ied. The notice shall be 
certified mail, postage 
addressed to the cant ['act 
maintains an office, conducts 
or her residence." ( sis 







amount claimed and 




his or her 
added. ) 
wa furnished or 
mailing the same 
in an envelope 
ace he or she 
business, or his 
the word "equipment," also 
include s iers of t in the notice od, 
and state that the notice runs from the when the last of the 
equipment was supplied to the subcontractor. s language does 
not anticipate a notice sent out days after each 
ece of equipment was s 'd, but rather after the last was 
supplied. 
It is also helpful to consider cases that have addressed the 
issue under the Miller Act. All 
MEMORANDU£Vl DECISION AND ORDEr< 
the language of the Miller 
16 
t I on e been 
I a equ 
unci h t. 
ui Co in u.s. ex. reI. Ca er-
son Inc. v. 293 F.2d 816 ( . Cir. \ 
19 1) f ld that the no ad run from the time the 
iva t i abi for u e on the project. See also 
u. 
7 F. d 90 (9 th C i r. 1 9 6 4) . 
the ~ no mention of in the Miller Act, 
shave uni held that notice as to all materials 
or 1 time if \;/i thin days from the date of 
delivery. U.S. for A&M Petroleum Inc. v. 
------------------------------------------------
Inc., 822 F.2d 547 ( 
------,~----~~.---~------
Santa Cir. 1987) (collecting 
cases from other circuits). See also U.S. v. Andrews, 406 F.2d 
r. 1969), and U.S. for the use and benefit of 
_W_a_t_e_r_, l_!V_O _____ .......2,~~ __ _k.._._v_· _. _G_e_o_' r .. -"'-_~'__ ___ C_:o_n_s_'_t_.~C.-· o."J 131 F. 3d 28 
(1 st Cir. 1997). The language of the case::; that deal with 
is the same as the language of those cases that deal 
with the s Y of 1 or mat'~rial; the notice runs from the 
t the equipment was last use(! on the ect, or from the time 
of the last delivery or supply. Thus, the analysis of a claim 
for labor or material vdll be th,) same as i~hat for supply of 
equ 
In addition, a notice period that runE from the date the 
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t wa 1 u on i i. Ii th 
a th t t fil 
The Nelti e 
the 11 Act in the can 1 h.el 
that th noU ad wa for 
wh made. on Co 
v. St. Pau] Fi N.Y. 4 ( 00 ). The 
court that thi ho 1 the 
1 slative intent of removing unne ary cles and 
ing to laborers and material s iers; 
a 1 Ii 1 date for general contractors s 
secondary under the Miller Act to ecting laborers and 
mate s iers, a s to t stated 
amendment of IC §54-2719. 
I President of Fox Hollow, and Egan, 
employee of Fox Hollar,}, a:'i 11 as Jones, President of 
Pro Rentals, state in the ts that the rent of 
ipment for the Ashton Pro-i ect was considered one contract, and 
the rental of equipment for the gby ect another, even 
though the invoices were generated See Aff. of Demian 
Egan, ~ 5; Aff. of David Egan, ~ 5; Aff. Jones, ~ 11. 
Jones states that invoie~s were generat rnonthly, even 
tho the equipment may be u :i.lized on the eet for a longer 
period. Aff. of Doug Jones, '1 11. Thus, the contract between 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 18 
t f runn ccount, rathe than 
t a Under 
t a re a 
ni ty , regardless of 
t occurred, nd bombard ractor 
cl and benefit of Robe s 
v. tAJill row Canst. Co. 8 6 F.Supp. 647 , 655 
(f] . 1,1 ~~ . 9 cIa unde 1 er Act must be 
u t cant and the s ier must 
1m nin aft r the \\ st of the 
mat a1 7f ied unde that contract; where claims are based 
a ies contracts, a claim must be made within 90 days 
from the dat on which the supplier ied the last of the 
mat al for contract) . 
Even i the between the parties had not been an 
open contract, cou s havE' red the issue, hold that 
the c in the .,1Otice requirements between an open 
contract and se s of contr~cts. Noland Co. v. Allied 
Contract 273 F. 2 d 917, 920 (4 th. Ci r. 1959). In 
Noland, the court held that the "90 day period is not stated to 
be measured from the te of U:e last delivery of the materials 
under an entire contract or on a running account or under each 
s rate order. Miller Act contemplates one such notice 
within 90 from the furni~hing of the last materials 
furnished in the prosecutioll of the prime contract from which 
MEMORANDUN DECISION AND OIWJ;R 19 
4 0 F . d 7 9 0 (4 th C i r . 
1 ) . 
purpo Hill t"vo d: 
9 t nd hi and 
h t. J n t.ha t he l,vJ 1 
a o those furni and 
7 4) . holdi that 
the not period is the date the last of 
the wa furnished to Fox Hollow, s does not 
the purpose of either Ie §54 2719 or the Miller Act. 
In thi ca e Harris also argues t the cIa again t them 
is ine able. Harris argues that it has Fox Hollmv the 
money rd parties such a~\ Pro Rentals. This was 
ected at least one other state court. See e .. Coast 
Electr Co. v. Industrial Indemnit Co. 144 Cal. .3d 879, 193 
r. 74 (1~8J). Courts hold that general contractors have a 
number of es available to protect them from cl of 
materi , such as withholding payment for ninety f paying 
subcontractors with cks issued jointly with mat , and 
performance bonds from subcontractors. Id. 
In this case, the e pment was rented by Fox Hollow for use 
at t Ri project from tL June 18, 2002. Since Ha s 
received notice on September 16 th from the Pocatello post office 
that Pro Rentals' certified letters were there to be picked up, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 20 
1 vJi [] t utory 90 noti 
nt. 1 summary j should be entered on Count 
IV County Pro Rent s and inst 
Un p in amount of ,018.93, with 
int and reasonabl 0 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
s on fo ng, t.he Court eludes, and IT IS 
HEREBY OEDEPE tal I motion for ial summary 
J i GRANTED. 
DATED this 16th October, 2003. 
/tl::R-~X/-W~ 
,~ i eha rd T. -~S-t-.-C-:-1-::--a-:-i-r---------
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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